Discussion Paper

EFFICACY OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO DEMOCRATIZATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

Presidential term limits are widely associated with good governance and, subsequently, development. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, their efficacy is the subject of notable controversy. As proponents have argued for them, several countries have removed them. Yet, hitherto, the efficacy of these term limits in promoting good governance and development has not been empirically scrutinized. This paper reports the findings of a study that attempted to fill this gap. Using data from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2014-2016), the study scrutinized the link between having presidential term limits and performance on safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. The findings were that there is but an insignificant link between having presidential term limits and performance on these attributes of good governance and development. The implications of this finding for efforts to promote the governance and development of these countries are discussed.

ACRONYMS

AU:	African Union
IDEA:	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IIAG:	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
OECD:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SIDA:	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In many parts of the developing world, presidential term limits are seen as an important avenue through which good governance and people-centered development programs may be promoted. This is especially the case in Africa, where long serving heads of government have exhibited despotic tendencies (Ginsburg, 2011), including rigging elections—the inference being that the countries they lead may only change to better leaders under the auspices of limits on presidential terms. However, review of related literature and observable practice shows that in Africa, the rationale and efficacy of presidential term limits is not without controversy. Two opposing views are prominent in discourse on governance and development on the continent. By the late 1990s, most African countries had established term limits in their constitutions (Oloka-Onyango, 2016). Yet, over the last two decades, various leaders (and their supporters) have sought removal of these limits (cf. Kavuma, 2016a; b)—contending that they are not necessarily associated with deepening democratic practice, good governance and development. Moreover, in a number of countries (e.g. Uganda and Rwanda) removal of presidential term limits has been framed as a grassroots, bottom-up, agenda, which should be respected as a choice like others in a democratic dispensation. Indeed, the success stories of developed countries that do not have term limits for heads of government like the United Kingdom have also been evoked to support the lifting of term limits.

However, a critical—and particularly vocal—lobby contends that unlimited presidential terms are an input into bad governance that poses a significant risk for democratization, good governance and development (see, for example, Kavuma, 2016c). Flagship among the reservations raised against unlimited presidential terms is the argument that very long serving regimes attract dissent and indulge in self-aggrandizement in an effort to tighten their grip on disagreeable people by way of patronage and suppression. Notably, young people see the *indefinite* stay of term unlimited leaders as depriving them their chance to lead in those same positions. Indeed, tired of being cajoled as the leaders of tomorrow, youths have formed a pivotal part of activism against the lifting of presidential term limits in the countries where proposals to do so have been presented (Harcsh 2014, Reuss 2016 and Sherman 2015).

Unsurprisingly, contention between the proponents and belittlers of the lifting of presidential term limits across the continent has been particularly intense, attracting heated parliamentary debates, referenda and a wide range of demonstrations and protests. However, a policy related gap in punditry on the subject of term limits relates to the fact that hard data in support of either side of the argument has not been generated to facilitate evidence-based policy processes on presidential term limits. On one hand, the motivations of leaders in favor of the lifting of presidential term limits have been criticized as merely egocentric. However, these leaders have argued that the proponents of limiting leadership to specified terms are unpopular politicians who wish to gain power opportunistically by disenfranchising the incumbents. Hence, the need for critical inquiry into the efficacy of presidential term limits in promoting good governance and development.

This study intended to respond to this need, following an academic approach that objectively weighed the merits and demerits of imposing presidential term limits. This was done using the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2014-2016) because it is a well-accepted estimation of democratization, good governance and development in Africa, especially considering that it inputs continent-wide data generated by respected departments of the United Nations, civil society, and national and regional administrations.

1.2 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to investigate the merits and demerits of imposing presidential term limits in Africa.

1.2.1 Specific Objectives

1. To investigate whether countries with presidential term limits perform better on rule of law
2. To investigate whether countries with presidential term limits perform better on participation and human rights
3. To investigate whether countries with presidential term limits perform better on sustainable economic opportunity
4. To investigate whether countries with presidential term limits perform better on human development

1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis

The study attempted to respond to one general research question: are presidential term limits effective in promoting good governance, democracy and development in Africa? This general research question was broken down into four specific research questions:

1. Do countries with presidential term limits perform better on safety and rule of law?
2. Do countries with presidential term limits perform better on participation and human rights?
3. Do countries with presidential term limits perform better on sustainable economic opportunity?
4. Do countries with presidential term limits perform better on human development?

It was hypothesized that countries with presidential term limits perform better than those that do not have them on the aforementioned indicators.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The study will inform efforts for civil society organizations, donors, regional organizations, and politicians on the efficacy of presidential term limits. Subsequently, policies that are specifically, relevant to the promotion of democracy, good governance and development will be developed that suit all countries, those with term limits and those without. Researchers in the areas of good governance, democracy and electoral democracy might also find the study beneficial.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study looked at countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and generated data from the IIAG for the period 2011, 2012 and 2013. Focus was put on the performance of countries with term limits and those without term limits on participation and human rights, human development, sustainable economic opportunity and safety and rule of law.

CHAPTER TWO: RELATED LITERATURE AND THE KNOWLEDGE GAP

2.1 Term limits

Term limits are the limitations placed on executive re-election at the national level, although it is not rare in some polities to restrict the tenure of legislators or other elected officials at the sub-national level. Ginsburg et al. (2011) define term limits as ‘pre-commitments through which the polity restricts its ability to retain a popular executive down the road’. Term limits come in various forms, but most contemporary constitutions place the cap at a maximum of two terms, which may run consecutively or non-consecutively (Ginsburg et al. 2011, IDEA 2011). While such pre-commitments have assumed particular importance in modern constitutional polities, they are by no means a product of contemporary practice. Doron and Harris (2001:5) and Ginsburg et al. (2011) provide extensive accounts of civilizations with comparable examples in classical and even biblical times. Then, as now, despotic and undemocratic leadership was the key concern with perpetual rule, although others have challenged the democratic thesis. Stein (1943) argues, for instance, that pre-commitments are artificial and illiberal constraints on democratic choice (cited in Ginsburg et al. 2011), while Armstrong (2011) contends that term limit clauses represent a lack of faith in the populace to make informed decisions. Politicians seeking to extend their tenure are often quick to exploit this paradox (Butty 2009). Armstrong, however, nuances his arguments by suggesting that term limits, while restricting democratic choice, ultimately promote democratic competition and are more likely to prevent authoritarianism than hinder democracy (Armstrong 2011). This argument concurs with Ginsburg et al (2011) who, after a thorough survey of the different arguments, conclude that term limits generally play a key role in democratic governance.

In many Sub-Saharan African countries, a number of stakeholders have advocated for presidential term limits as a way to achieve peaceful power alteration and to ensure that sitting executives do not remain entrenched. These limits have also been suggested with the view to create opportunities for leadership capacity building among the politically minded individuals, provide new hope among the citizens, competitive elections and the development of the electoral institutions. However, attempts by sitting African presidents to extend or remove term limits have led to conflicts – sometimes resolved by reaffirming term limits, but at other times leading either to prolonged political disorder or authoritarian stability. The future of presidential term limits on the continent is still evolving, as many countries contend with the difficulties of building democracy. The campaigns to establish or defend presidential term limits have been pivotal to democratic political change in these countries. These provisions have been used to circumscribe the power of presidential incumbents in countries where control and resources are highly centralized and loyalty to the ruling party has been the ready route to public benefits. Campaigns for term limits have also enabled opposition parties to unite, and to overcome fragmentation and divisions among contesting leaders to mount concerted efforts to oust incumbents. Civil society organizations also support term limits as a way to avoid partisan splits and advance the rule of law. Term limits likewise show a possible pathway to uphold the legal autonomy of the judicial system. Public opinion is often mobilized around campaigns for term limits, enabling collective action to challenge offenses or corruption by the ruling regime. And, finally, struggles for term limits offer openings for international pressures on behalf of neutral application of the law and the establishment of preconditions for more competitive democratic elections. Therefore this study sought to inquire into the efficacy of presidential term limits with a specific focus on democratization, good governance and development.

2.2 Democratization and Good Governance: An Overview

Democratization has been linked to good governance, which the World Bank defines as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (World Bank, 1989) and also regards as synonymous with sound development (World Bank, 1992). The relationship between democratization and good governance, which is supported and promoted by institutions such as the World Bank, United States, British and French governments, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Council and the Commonwealth Secretariat, is based on the fact that the latter (good governance) has the ingredients, features, the functional and institutional prerequisites as well as the building blocks of democratization. These include an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, representative legislature; respect for the rule of law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press (World Bank, 1989).

On the other hand, to Leftwich (1993; 1994) the concept of "democratic good governance" has the three main levels of meaning which can be classified into systemic, political and administrative. First, from a systematic angle, good governance is government that embraces the formed institutional structure location of authoritarian decision making in the modern state power. In this sense, good governance denotes the structures of political and crucially, economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed (Leftwich, 1993, Leftwich, 1994). In short, good governance means a "democratic capitalist" regime presided over by a minimal state which forms part of the wider governance of the New World Order (World Bank, 1989; World Bank, 1992; Healey and Robinson; Leftwich 1994).

Second, from a political sense, good governance presupposes a regime or state which enjoys legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Whether in a presidential or parliamentary system, this presupposes a pluralist polity with a freely and regularly elected representative legislature, with the capacity at least to influence and check executive power (Leftwich, 1993: Leftwich, 1994).

Third, from an administrative point of view, good governance means an efficient, independent, accountable and open audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is. It also entails an independent judicial system to uphold the law and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy. The administrative aspect of good governance focuses on four main areas of public administration in general and public sector management in particular. These are: 1) Accountability, which in essence means holding government officials responsible for their actions; 2) a legal framework for development, which means a structure of rules and laws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private sector, which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide the basis for conflict resolution through an independent judicial system; 3) information, by which is meant that information about economic conditions, budgets, markets and government intentions is reliable and accessible to all, something which is crucial for private sector calculations; and 4) insistence on transparency, which is basically a call for open government, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate consultative processes between government and private interests over policy development (World Bank, 1992; Leftwich, 1993; Leftwich, 1994). Viewed from the above descriptions of good governance, it is no wonder that the concept is inseparable from the process of democratization.

Democracy promoters acknowledge that many of the difficulties facing new democracies steam not so much from excessive executive power but from institutionally weak states. Indeed, the fundamental requisite for an effective democracy is a state that works. A state that is not effective significantly affects the credibility of democracy. Conversely, a democratic regime that is not efficient will hamper economic performance. As the democracy agenda is reconsidering the role of the state in development, traditional structural adjustment policies advocated by international financial institutions are being reconsidered. (Santiso 2001)

2.3 Democratic governance

Governance is the use of political authority and exercise of control over society, and the management of state resources for social and economic development. It encompasses, ‘the nature of functioning of a state’s institutional and structural arrangement, decision-making process, policy formulation, implementations capacity, information flows, effectiveness of leadership and the nature of relations between rulers and the ruled’ (Landell-Mills and Seragerldine, 1991). Governance, broadly defined, covers all aspects of the complex and myriad relations that exist between a government and a people.

Several characteristics define governance. These include accountability based on the notion of popular sovereignty and public choice, a legal framework that guarantees the rule of law and due process, popular participation in decision-making processes based on political and social pluralism, freedom of association and expression, bureaucratic accountability, uniform application of rules, and rationality of organisational structures (Robinson, 1993). The entire constitutional system and institutional structure is therefore meant to create conditions and support efforts for governance.

Democratic governance implies, over and above technical efficiency and probity, regular interaction between government and civil society, and free participation by the latter through its institutions and popular organs. In turn this presupposes that democracy prevails in general (Mafeje, 2002). The major instrument for the realization of democratic governance is the constitution.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

Measuring democracy, governance and development is a field that has developed rapidly with the support of multilateral donors and development agencies like the World Bank and the UN Agencies. The World Bank Governance Indicators and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) are fast acquiring a reputation in this respect. With substantial inputs from academic communities, donors and development agencies, significant progress has been recorded in the development of governance assessment tools and governance-related indices. However, there are still many challenges in effectively measuring and analyzing democracy and governance, including how best to meaningfully measure governance, the inadequacy of indicators for measuring key governance processes, and 'lack of agreement over who is best placed to provide insights as to the quality of governance in a country and how it compares to the situation in other countries' (Court et al. 2002: 1).

Sources of data for several of the evaluations and assessments of democracy and good governance and development in Africa range from the desk study approach used by USAID, to several country impact assessments by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program and other UN Agencies, United Kingdom's Department for International Development, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the European Commission and other development assistance providers whose mandate includes promoting democracy and good governance in the non-European world. Data from sources such as Human Right Watch, Amnesty International, and Transparency International are regularly used as indicators for measuring democratic progress. For example, data from Freedom House's annual country ratings for political and civil rights are 'often used as proxy for the level of democracy' (IDEA & SIDA 2007: 27). Methods of measuring democracy and good governance, by western donors and analysts, draw data from interviews with stakeholders, case studies, evaluators' own observations made during field visits and opinion surveys. Networks of personal contacts and local newspapers have also been used by researchers and evaluators to get information that may not be easily available.

For this particular study, data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) was used. It was used with confidence that it is credible because the IIAG compiles data from 33 independent institutions which helps to build an accurate and detailed picture of governance performance in African countries. These independent global institutions comprise of Cross-Country Surveys of Firms, Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals, Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies, Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks, Expert Assessments from Governments and Multilateral Organizations and these included; African Development Bank, African Union Commission, Afro barometer, Amnesty International, Freedom House, Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, Global Integrity, Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Inter-

Parliamentary Union, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, United States Department of State-Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, World Economic Forum, World Bank and World Health Organization.

The performance of the 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa on the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (MIIA) for the three years studied (i.e. 2012, 2013 and 2014) was plotted on a bar graph. Subsequently, the countries were put into categories by performance. Subsequently, the countries were assigned to two broad categories according to whether or not they had presidential term limits. The mean performance of each of the categories on each of the four attributes of democracy, good governance and development were then computed. The differences in these means were computed to make an indication of which of the two categories performed better than the other on the indicators. To test the hypothesis that countries with presidential term limits perform better than those that do not have them on the aforementioned indicators, these mean differences were subjected to a Student-t test at the level of confidence p. = .05 using SPSS 16.0. The results were tabulated.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Discussion

The findings on the quality of overall governance of the countries studied are summarized in Figure 4.1.



* Does not have Presidential Term Limits

Figure 4.1: Performance on Overall Governance (2012-2014) (/100)

Source: Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2014-2016)

Figure 4.1 shows that, overall, the 49 countries studied fall in two broad categories: those with limits on their presidential terms and those that do not have term limits. Thirty-six, representing 73 percent, of the 49 countries have presidential term limits. It also shows that, across the three years (2012-2014), the performance of the countries on overall governance fell in six levels: 70 to 80, 60 to 69, 50 to 59, 40-49, 30-39 and 20-29. Three exceptions are noted in Mauritius (which scored over 80 in 2012 and 2013), Somalia (which scored below 10 in all the three years) and South Sudan (which scored below 20 in 2014). Besides these exceptions, most of the countries fell under the 40 to 49 category (16, representing 33 percent), followed by 50 to 59 (12, representing 24 percent). About the same number of countries (5) fell under the categories 70 to 80 and 30 to 39. This shows that, on the whole, only a few of the countries are performing superbly well and awfully poorly; for majority of the countries, the quality of overall governance is marginal. Regarding presidential term limits, it is particularly noteworthy that countries that do not have term limits are spread across all the categories. In light of the truism that presidential term limits enhance good governance, the finding that Mauritius, the best performing country, did not have these limits while Somalia and South Sudan, by far the worst performing countries, did have these limits is particularly notable. These, however, are exceptions. Therefore, to reach dependable judgments on the efficacy of presidential term limits in enhancing democratization, good governance and development the countries' performance on each of four proxies of these variables (i.e. safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development) was disaggregated and comparison between countries with and those without term limits made (Table 4.1).

Table 4. 1: Mean difference in performance on attributes of governance

		Have term limits			Do not have term limits			Mean difference			Student-t				Sig.		
	N	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	Df	2012	2013	2014
Safety and rule of law	49	50.70	50.56	51.38	54.06	52.55	52.11	-3.36*	-1.98*	-0.73*	-0.64	-0.36	-0.13	47	0.53	0.39	0.48
Participation and human rights	49	49.77	50.30	50.04	49.47	49.75	49.34	0.30	0.54	0.71	0.05	0.09	0.13	47	0.96	0.26	0.24
Sustainable economic opportunity	49	43.39	43.24	42.91	41.96	42.17	41.45	1.43	1.07	1.45	0.30	0.22	0.30	47	0.77	0.91	0.96
Human development	49	54.79	54.27	55.49	53.49	50.52	53.88	1.30	3.75	1.61	0.30	0.74	0.36	47	0.77	0.52	0.85

*Mean difference in favor of countries without term limits.

Table 4.1 shows that countries with presidential term limits scored higher than those that did not on all the attributes except "safety and rule of law". This suggests that presidential term limits are associated with better participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development, exceptions in individual country experiences notwithstanding. Thus, the analysis vindicates arguments for presidential term limits. However, Table 4.1 also shows that the mean differences registered between the scores of countries that have presidential term limits and the scores of countries that do not have these limits were not statistically significant ($p > .05$). A possible inference here is that presidential term limits contribute to participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development albeit marginally.

The finding that presidential term limits contribute but only marginally to participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development rhymes well with the fact that some of the world's major democracies/ economies (like Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, India, etc.) do not have presidential term limits yet other countries that have presidential term limits (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, etc.) have experienced more volatility. Indeed, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, Figure 4.1 gives a vivid demonstration: Mauritius, which has no limits on the terms of the head of government, leads in all the indicators of good governance while Somalia and South Sudan, which have term limits, trail. Moreover, on the other hand, countries (e.g. United States and China) exist which are well rated for stability and development but have presidential term limits. As such, the analysis points to the significance of factors, other than presidential term limits, which influence countries' performance in the areas of governance and development. Review of related literature leads to the conclusion that these factors are diverse and could differ widely across country and regional settings. For instance, despite having presidential term limits, Somalia and South Sudan are the victims of decades of civil war that has ravaged infrastructure and repulsed investment.

The finding that *other* factors may be more significant than presidential term limits in enhancing democratization and development gives credence to the view that commentary on the democratization and development of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa should touch on more than just presidential term limits. Furthermore, the view that these factors could differ significantly across country and regional settings points to need for commentators and policy persons to take the specificity of individual countries into account in their recommendations and actions. Yet, related literature (e.g. Kavuma, 2016a, b, c; Oloka-Onyango, 2016) shows that in Sub-Saharan Africa, institution of presidential term limits is being promoted as invariably beneficial with the hypothesis being that countries will be more democratized and developed once they have these term limits. This hypothesis is not evidence-based (Table 4.1). That is why performance on governance was found to be marginal in majority of the countries studied despite the fact that up to 73 per cent of them have these limits.

4.2 Conclusion

It is concluded that besides limits on presidential terms, *other* factors influence countries' performance in the areas of governance and development. Review of related literature leads to the conclusion that these factors are diverse and could differ widely across country and regional contexts, which is why countries like Somalia and South Sudan (both victims of decades of civil war that has ravaged infrastructure and repulsed investment) are underdeveloped despite having presidential term limits.

4.3 Recommendations

It is recommended that policy persons and commentators on presidential term limits, democratization and development take the specificity of individual country contexts into account when making recommendations on presidential term limits touching on different countries. This will allow countries to avoid the pitfalls inherent to promotion of presidential term limits as invariably beneficial, which will ensure that term limits are promoted where they are valuable and relaxed where they are not.

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Appendix: Performance of Sub-Saharan Countries on Indicators of Good Governance and Development

Year	**2012**					**2013**					**2014**				
Country/ Indicator	Overall Governance	Safety & Rule of Law	Participation &Human Rights	Sustainable economic Opportunity	Human Development	Overall Governance	Safety & Rule of Law	Participation &Human Rights	Sustainable economic Opportunity	Human Development	Overall Governance	Safety & Rule of Law	Participation &Human Rights	Sustainable economic Opportunity	Human Development
Angola	41.7	44.7	40.2	34.9	47	40.8	44.3	40.2	32.4	46.3	40.8	43.8	40.2	31.6	47.6
Benin	58.9	61.9	69	48.4	56.5	58.4	60.2	69.2	47.1	57	58.8	61.2	68.3	47.7	57.8
Botswana	76.2	84.1	73.6	68.1	79	76	84.4	72.8	67	79.7	74.2	82.7	68.7	66.1	79.5
Burkina Faso*	52.8	57.5	55	50.7	48	52.4	56	58.8	49.3	48.3	52.2	55.2	55.9	49	48.9
Burundi	44.7	42	46.7	36.4	53.8	45.3	41	47.7	36.8	55.7	45.8	39.8	50.3	35.4	57.7
Cameroon*	47.8	49.1	39.7	43.6	58.6	47.3	47.3	39.6	43	59.3	45.9	44.2	37.9	41.6	59.3
Cape Verde	76.5	78.3	86.3	62.3	79.1	75.4	76.1	86	61.7	77.8	74.5	75.9	83.1	60.6	78.6
CAR	32.4	25.8	38.2	33.2	32.4	24.2	11.5	33.5	24.1	27.9	24.9	14.3	34.1	22	29
Chad*	32.6	36.8	28.2	30.4	35	31.9	35.1	28.3	28.9	35.4	32.8	38.7	30.6	27.9	34.1
Comoros*	48.3	53.5	55.5	27.3	56.7	49.4	54.3	55.3	30.7	57	48.5	56.2	51.3	27.4	58.9
Congo	42.1	44.5	36.1	34.5	52.3	42.6	46.4	36.1	35.4	22.6	42.8	45.8	38.2	36.8	50.4
Congo*	42.1	44.5	36.1	34.5	52.3	42.6	46.4	36.1	35.4	22.6	42.8	45.8	38.2	36.8	50.4
Cote d'Ivoire	44.1	40.8	44.8	43.2	47.6	46.8	45.1	49.6	43.8	48.7	48.3	47	50.3	46	49.7
Djibouti	46.1	50	37	43.2	54	45.8	49.6	37	43.1	53.6	45.9	52.4	35.7	42.3	53.3
DRC	32.5	25.1	35.2	26.7	42.8	33	24.2	33.3	30.8	43.6	33.9	28.3	32.4	31.4	43.4
Equatorial Guinea	35.9	39.8	26.1	26	51.9	36	39.5	24.3	27	53.3	33.9	39.3	22	27.6	53.1
Eritrea	29.5	31.5	23.1	20.1	43.3	29	30.7	22	19.2	44	29.9	30.6	22.1	20.3	46.5
Ethiopia	45.5	46	34.3	49.6	52	46.5	49.9	33.8	48.8	53.3	48.6	55.1	35.7	46.9	56.7
Gabon*	51.6	58.1	45.3	42.2	61	52.1	58.5	46.9	41.2	61.8	52.2	57.7	48.6	41.2	61.2
Gambia	52.6	52.5	36.8	53.7	67.3	51.8	51.9	36.8	51.9	66.4	50.5	50.1	36.4	50.2	65.3
Ghana	67.5	71.6	74.5	51.9	72	68.1	71.4	75.4	53	72.7	70.6	67.3	70.6	51.3	71.5
Guinea*	44.5	49.1	47.9	33.8	47.1	44	47.4	46.3	34.3	48	43.7	47.9	46	32.4	48.7
Guinea-Bissau	33.4	35	29.7	24	44.8	31.9	33.4	29.5	21	43.7	35.7	36.8	37.7	24.1	44.2
Kenya	55.2	51.3	53.8	52.7	62.8	57	51.7	59.5	53.3	63.5	58.8	53.8	63.3	54.9	63
Lesotho	60.7	66.1	68.1	51.3	57.3	61.5	65.8	71.2	51.3	57.6	61.1	66.7	70.9	50.5	56.4
Liberia	50.7	55.7	58.3	38.9	49.9	49.5	53.1	58.1	37.9	49.1	50.7	55.6	56.2	39.9	50.9
Madagascar	45.7	45.2	47.6	42.5	47.6	48.1	49.6	52.7	42.5	47.7	49.1	57.7	58	39.3	46.3
Malawi	57.3	64.6	63.6	47.1	54.1	58.1	65.1	64.4	47.5	55.2	56.7	64	63	45.6	54.2
Mali	49.2	48.5	48	49.3	51.2	49.3	48.9	48.6	49.5	50.2	48.7	48.7	45.2	49.2	51

Mauritius*	81.1	84.9	76.8	77.9	84.9	80.7	82.7	76.8	78	85.4	79.9	82.7	73.8	77.5	85.7
Mozambique	54.2	59.5	59.1	48.1	49.9	52.5	53.4	60.4	46.7	49.5	52.3	54	59.9	45.4	49.8
Namibia*	68.3	73.3	71.1	64.4	63.9	68.7	73.3	72.1	63.2	66	70.4	74.3	76.1	64	67.1
Niger*	48.4	53.6	56.2	39.6	44.2	48.2	53.3	56	39.5	43.9	48.4	51.5	56.8	42.3	43.1
Nigeria	44.5	40.9	48.8	39.1	49.2	45.3	39.6	49.8	40.9	50.8	44.9	41.8	48.8	37	52.2
Rwanda	59.3	58.1	46	64.9	68.4	60	58.7	47	64	70.2	60.7	62	46.3	63.5	71
Sao Tome & Principle	58.9	62.4	68.4	37.6	67.4	59.5	62	68.5	40	67.7	59.1	61.5	67.6	40.4	67.7
Senegal	60.3	60.6	69.8	52.4	58.2	62.2	64.5	71.7	54.1	58.6	62.4	66.5	70.6	51.3	61.1
Seychelles	71.4	72.2	68.8	63.7	80.9	71.4	71.6	69.1	64.1	80.9	70.3	71.1	63.7	64.7	82.4
Sierra Leone	50.3	56.1	61.9	39.4	43.8	51.4	59.2	61	40.9	44.6	51	58	60.8	39.9	45.1
Somalia	7.9	5.8	10	3.7	12.2	7.8	5.8	9.2	3.5	12.6	8.5	5.5	10.4	4.1	14
South Africa	72	67	73.1	71.8	75.5	72.8	66.9	74.1	72.3	78	73	68.4	73.9	72.3	77.3
South Sudan*	28.2	32.1	24.9	20.1	35.7	22.3	20.6	24.4	23.6	20.5	19.9	14.9	20.6	13.5	30.5
Sudan	27.6	17.8	21.9	29	41.7	28.9	21.1	22.9	29.3	42.3	28.3	20.1	22.6	31.8	38.7
Swaziland	49.2	57.9	30.7	50.5	57.5	50	59.9	30.3	51.1	58.7	49.6	59.2	29.5	50.3	59.6
Tanzania	57.7	58.4	66.2	47.9	58.3	58	57.5	66	49.7	58.6	56.7	56.9	64.1	49	56.8
Togo*	45.4	54.7	45.6	31	50.1	45.6	53.8	46.2	31.3	51	48.4	55.3	48.4	37.5	52.4
Uganda*	56.4	55.7	60.9	50	57.9	55.4	54.4	60	49.8	57.6	54.6	53	57.2	47.8	60.1
Zambia	59.8	67.7	61.3	51.2	58.8	59.2	66.3	60	51.4	59.2	59.5	66.7	59.1	50.7	61.5
Zimbabwe	36.8	35.8	34.6	24.7	51.9	38.7	40	39	23.4	52.5	40.4	41	41.9	24.6	54.2

Source: Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2014-2016)